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ligion than the existence of the previously invisible Neptune proved to the science of astronomy. Dr. King is certainly incorrect in his assertion that the religious man "would hardly claim that his deity is a phenomenon" (p. 264). The God of the common religious man and of the pluralist philosopher (when he has one) is just that,—a phenomenal conscious being like the rest of us. And it might perfectly well transpire in the course of psychological investigation that certain facts,—say those of the mystic consciousness,—would be better explained on the hypothesis of such a (hitherto) unknown but communicating consciousness than on the supposition that we already have knowledge of all the relevant causes. It must be admitted, however, that while this is a possibility, it is one which the psychologist would hardly be justified in acting upon and using as a serious hypothesis until he has in vain exhausted all other modes of explanation.

The chief value of Dr. King's book lies in its emphasis upon the influence which social structure and custom have in determining the direction and detail of religious development. The careful study of primitive peoples,—with which nearly all this book is taken up and which is now becoming so generally popular,—certainly throws considerable light upon the higher phases of religion. Too much, however, must not be expected from this sort of thing. We must beware of seeking to explain the better known by the less known. And when all is said, the key to our own deeper religious problems must be sought here and now,—in the spiritual life of the cultured nations and individuals of the twentieth century, rather than in Australia or among the Semites of the year 1000 B. C.

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HANDBOOK OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By T. Clark Murray, LL.D., F.R.S.C. London: T. and T. Clark, 1909. Pp. 328.

Opinions differ as to what the term Christian Ethics should stand for. Should it mean the teaching of Jesus? A view of life which would be an interpretation of the life of Jesus? The teaching of the early disciples or of the 'Christian Church?' Professor Murray's book is not a handbook of Ethics which is specifically Christian in any of the senses referred to. It is based

largely on the teaching of Jesus, but that teaching has gone through a process of winnowing and modification to bring it into line with idealistic ethics of the kind that we are familiar with in this country through the teachings of T. H. Green. Our author tends to suspect what is original. All would agree with him that the primary question is not whether an idea is original, but whether it is true, and he is perhaps right when he says that "to the scientific thinker absolute originality is so far from being any recommendation of a doctrine that it would be viewed rather as a ground of suspicion" (p. 40). The 'scientific thinker,' however, in his desire to obtain universal statements, is too prone to forget that a real personality is original, and that his life cannot be briefly summarized as an instance of an abstract general law. 'Scientific' thinking is sometimes in danger of being applied exclusively to the method of investigation prevalent in the abstract physical sciences where universal statements are obtained through leaving out the manifold variety of the concrete world. True science, it need scarcely be said, should take account of the actual facts of life, recognizing differences where they exist. A criticism one is compelled to pass on this handbook is that it ignores certain characteristics of the teaching and life of Christ. For example, the index does not contain the words cross, sacrifice, eschatology; and a perusal of the book itself shows that this is no oversight. The significance of these conceptions, which meant so much for Jesus and the early disciples, and, in a modified form, have meant so much for the church since, is not discussed. The suggestion of the possibility of irreconcilable antagonism between the good to others resulting from the individual's action and his own good is dismissed with the remark that it would "reduce moral life from an intelligible order to an unintelligible chaos and render any science of it impossible." But is any account of life, as we know it, which does not recognize this possibility intelligible? It is surely not obvious how denying father, mother, wife, child, and even life itself for the sake of Christ and his Gospel is for the individual's own good. And it is far less obvious how, in view of such statements, the Christian principle of life for the individual is "to love his neighbor as himself,—not less, but also not more." Jesus died on the cross; and many who have given similar service to their fellow-men have had the same bitter kind of experience. If they found their own lives, it

was after dying and through dying. Professor Murray does not consider the tragic element in life, although at the centre of Christianity there stands a Cross. Neither does he recognize the pessimistic attitude which Jesus seemed to take towards the possibility of the world's gradual improvement, an attitude emphasized by many in recent years. Our author has a cheerful belief in moral evolution and progress. Consequently he attaches no importance to the eschatological aspects of Christ's teaching, differing in this respect from the general practice of the church. A book on Christian ethics should, we think, take account of these matters; and whether they are dismissed as ephemeral, or resolved into something different, reasons should be given for the course pursued.

The author's aim seems to have been to compare and correlate what he considered to be the best ethical teachings of all countries. And in this he has succeeded. Many thinkers, ancient and modern, greet us in his pages. Greek thinkers, naturally, contribute very largely to the discussion. The description of the ethical ideal is as much Greek as Palestinian in form: "Christian morality consists in loving our fellow-men as we love ourselves, such love being a rational habit of life, which is revealed in Christ as the realization of God's will with regard to man, and therefore of man's love to God." And love "is essentially reason or intelligence in its application to the mutual relations of intelligent beings" (pp. 25-27). But was not the emotional element in love the more prominent in the thought of Palestine? Was there not in it something akin to the unreasoning, not to say unreasonable, 'passion for souls' emphasized by 'evangelical' preachers?

Professor Murray emphasizes the dependence of ethics on theology or metaphysics. He has no belief in a 'creedless morality'; but calls for a simplified and practical creed which can receive the "assent of the scientific intelligence." A creed which cannot be "verified by experiment and observation" will satisfy nothing but idle curiosity. How such tests are to be applied to ultimate metaphysical problems he does not tell us. Their application is, of course, beyond the scope of this book. To sum up. Our chief criticism is that the author tends to oversimplify the intricate problems of life, and that the 'simple,' 'practical' solutions he aims at are of doubtful value. Apart from this oversimplification,—a simplification which our author

may be inclined to defend on the ground that he only intended to write an introductory manual,—the work is valuable as a clear and interesting presentation of a difficult subject. It is well arranged and abounds in illustrations and literary allusions.

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IDEALISM AS A PRACTICAL CREED. By Henry Jones, LL.D., D.Litt. Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1909. Pp. ix, 299.

This book consists of lectures delivered before the University of Sydney. Though described as lectures, they might almost as well be described as sermons,—sermons on texts from Hegel: for they are most of them concerned with the application of philosophy to life. And very eloquent sermons they are. The rhetoric is perhaps at moments a little too exuberant for a cold Anglo-Saxon taste; but their intellectual distinction is undeniable.

These lectures are intended to give the educated but not professedly philosophic hearer or reader some notion of the bearing upon life of the philosophy which their author represents. And that purpose they may be said fairly to achieve from the point of one who still finds the well-known formulæ of what may be called the Cairdian wing of the Hegelian school as satisfying and as important as they seemed to be to so many thirty or forty years ago. Those who have never been able fully to appreciate the profundity of the Hegelian commonplaces will perhaps at moments find themselves not so much questioning the truth of the familiar dicta, as marveling at the unction with which Professor Jones enunciates them. “We do not consider that we understand anything rightly,—nor plant, nor animal, nor man, not even the fixed strata of the earth’s crust, or the planet itself,—till we can indicate its place in a process” (p. 23). “Civilization is nothing but the process of revealing and realizing the Nature of Man, and the revelation is still going on, mysteriously and tortuously enough” (p. 34). “It is the spirit which has built up the social world that becomes in its own members aware of what it has achieved. By means of their mind, it examines itself and achieves freedom” (p. 57). “The Greeks, says Hegel, had no conscience” (p. 72). “Hence the ethical enquiries of Socrates were fatal to the Greek